Abstract: Contingent ownership structures are p r evalent in joint ventures. This paper o ers an explanation based on the investment incentives provided by such an arrangement. We consider a hold-up problem in which two parties make relationshipspeci c investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the future. In our model, the following ownership structure implements rst best investments: one party owns the rm initially, while the other party has the option to buy the rm at a set price a t a later date. This result is robust to the possibility of renegotiation and uncertainty. JEL classification numbers: D23, G32, L22.
Introduction
This paper o ers a new explanation for the use of contingent ownership structures in joint ventures. Suppose that two parties, A and B, want to set up a rm and have to agree on how to allocate ownership and control rights. Customary ownership structures are that A owns and controls the rm, that B owns it, or that there is some form of joint o wnership. We consider slightly more complicated, contingent ownership structures. A, say, could own the rm initially, but B is given the option to buy the rm at a predetermined price at some later date. We show that if the parties have to make relationship-speci c investments and if they invest sequentially, then such an option may su ce to induce both parties to invest e ciently.
The use of contingent ownership structures, in particular of warrants and convertible securities, is prevalent in joint ventures. A warrant is an option to purchase a set number of common shares at a set price on or before a set date. For example, in January 1997, Arcor, a new telecommunications company, w as set up by Deutsche Bahn German Rail and a consortium of Mannesmann, AT&T, and Unisource. Initially, Deutsche Bahn controls 50.2 of Arcor's common stock. But the consortium of Mannesmann, AT&T and Unisource has an option to increase its stockholding in 1999 at a predetermined price to 74.9 see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 24, 1997, No. 20, p. 22 . Convertible debt is a package of a debt contract and a warrant. The holder of convertible debt has the right to give up his bond in exchange for common stock at a set conversion price. In his extensive eld study Sahlman 1990 reports that the use of convertible debt and other convertible securities is common to nearly all venture capital nancing. What is the rationale for such an option to control a rm in the future?
In our model, the basic idea of an option-to-own contract is the following. Suppose that the two parties have to make relationship-speci c investments sequentially. For example, A may have to invest in the development of a new product or a new production technology.
Thereafter, B may have to invest in the marketing of the goodthat is going to beproduced by the rm. Suppose that A owns the rm initially, but that B has the option to buy it after A's investment has been made but before the surplus is being realized. The more A invested, the higher is B's valuation for the rm. Thus, B will exercise his option if and only if A's investment is su ciently high. If the option price is chosen appropriately, B will buy the rm if and only if A invested at least the e cient amount. This in turn induces A to invest e ciently. First, if A invests too little, B will not exercise his option, A foregoes the option price and remains the owner the rm. Because B's investment incentives are diluted when A owns the rm, the rm is not worth very much to A. In particular, we assume that B will not invest at all when A is the owner, ensuring that A prefers not bestranded with the rm and invests at least the e cient amount. Second, A is not going to overinvest either. Since B becomes the owner whenever A invests at least the e cient amount, B will get most of the marginal bene ts if A invests too much. Thus, there is no incentive for A to overinvest. Finally, if -as we assume -B-ownership is su cient to induce B to invest e ciently, then an option contract implements the rst best.
Our analysis follows the seminal paper by Grossman and Hart 1986 and the literature on incomplete contracts 1 in assuming that the only long-term contracts that can be written are contracts on ownership rights.
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For the case of simultaneous investment decisions Grossman and Hart show that there is no unconditional ownership contract that induces both parties to invest e ciently. The same result obtains in our model with sequential investments Proposition 1. Grossman and Hart do not consider conditional ownership structures even though they do mention the possibility of options on ownership. 3 Our results show that with sequential investment decisions option-to-own contracts can induce both parties to invest e ciently.
The intuition for our results can be related to the Arcor example given above. Before Arcor can compete successfully with Deutsche Telekom on the newly liberalized German telecommunications market, huge investments have to be made. The role of Deutsche Bahn is to build up a new cable network along its railroad lines. This alone requires an investment o f D M 4-5 billion. The Mannesmann consortium brings in its technological and marketing expertise in telecommunications. It has to set up the product line and to develop the customer base. By giving Mannesmann the option to buy a controlling stake in Arcor in 1999, Deutsche Bahn has a strong incentive t o i n v est e ciently. The more Deutsche Bahn invests, the more valuable is 1 See Hart 1995, ch. 2-4 and Tirole 1994 for excellent surveys of this literature. 2 This should be viewed as a simplifying assumption, meant to capture the idea that only incomplete contracts can be written so that the allocation of ownership rights retains an important role in providing appropriate investment incentives.
3 See Grossman and Hart 1986, Footnote 13. Hart 1995, Chapter 4 shows that an option-to-own contract improves upon a simple ownership structure, although it cannot achieve the rst best in his example.
Arcor for Mannesmann. Thus, only if Deutsche Bahn invests su ciently, it is worthwhile for Mannesmann to exercise its option. If Mannesmann does not exercise the option, Deutsche Bahn is left with its cable network, which i s w orth much less to her without the cooperation of Mannesmann. Finally, in the long-run it is clearly e cient that the Mannesmann consortium with its expertise in running telecommunications companies should own and control Arcor which is also achieved by the option contract. Note also that rapid technological progress and frequent regulatory changes in the telecommunications industry make i t v ery di cult to write a complete contingent contract on the required investments. Furthermore, Deutsche Bahn is also modernizing its railway network and probably has some discretion in shifting investment costs from its railway business to the telecommunication network. Similarly, Mannesmann runs its own celular phone network already and may have some discretion in shifting pro ts between these two businesses, thus limiting the scope to provide incentives by contracts that condition on pro ts.
The formal structure of our model is quite similiar to the ones in Demski and Sappington 1991 and Edlin and Hermalin 1997 . Both of these papers consider a principal-agent model with a sequential double moral hazard problem. Demski and Sappington show that an option contract that gives the principal the right to sell his rm to the agent at a predetermined price induces both parties to choose the e cient level of e ort. Furthermore, since the option will not be exercised in equilibrium, the rst best can be implemented even if the agent is risk averse. Edlin and Hermalin 1997 , Section 3 point out that the contract suggested by Demski and Sappington is not robust to renegotiation. They show that if renegotiation cannot be prohibited, then an option contract with a di erent option price can implement the rst best if and only if investments are substitutes at the margin. It is important to note that they consider only the case where the option has to be exercised after the agent but before the principal invested. We show that if the exercise date of the option is delayed until after both parties invested, then the rst best can be implemented with renegotiation even if investments are complements at the margin. Furthermore, Edlin and Hermalin restrict attention to the case where the owner of the rm captures all the bene ts of the investments while we allow for more general payo functions. On the other hand, Edlin and Hermalin consider the case where one of the two parties is risk averse, while we restrict attention to risk neutral players. 4 4 Edlin and Hermalin's main result for the risk-neutral case corresponds to our Proposition 5. The two N oldeke and Schmidt 1996 and Maskin and Tirole 1996, Section 3 also consider options on asset ownership. Our present work generalizes the simple example with one-sided investments that we considered in N oldeke and Schmidt 1996. Maskin and Tirole 1996 consider an example in which both parties jointly own the rm initially. After simultaneous investments have been made, each party gets with probability 0.5 the right to sell its shares to the other party at a predetermined price in which case the other party has to pay a ne to an outsider. The option will only beexercised if one party failed to invest e ciently. However, o the equilibrium path a ne has to bepaid to an outsider. Hence the contract is not renegotiation-proof.
Our paper is also related to Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey 1994 , Chung 1991 , Edlin and Reichelstein 1996 , Hart and Moore 1988 , Hermalin and Katz 1994 , and N oldeke and Schmidt 1995 . In these papers long-term contracts on trade between the two parties are feasible, but whether trade is e cient depends on the realization of a complex state of the world that cannot becontracted upon. Most of these papers demonstrate that simple" long-term contracts on trade can induce rst best investments in various contexts. In particular, N oldeke and Schmidt 1995 show that an option contract that gives one of the parties the right but not the obligation to trade the good at a predetermined price can induce both parties to invest e ciently. In the present paper the option is not an option to trade, but rather an option on asset ownership. Thus, there is no need to specify the good to be traded in the initial contract. Furthermore, all of the above mentioned papers restrict attention to self-investments, i.e., the seller" invests in reducing her costs, while the buyer" invests in his valuation of the good. In contrast, the work presented here allows for direct externalities of both investments. In this sense, we allow for the possibility that investments are cooperative" as in Che and Hausch 1996. 5 Finally, we do not use the initial contract to allocate the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage. In our paper the allocation of bargaining power is given exogenously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 restricts attention to the case where the parties cannot renegotiate the initial contract. First, it is shown that no unconditional ownership structure can implement the rst best. Then we papers have been written independently and almost at the same time. 5 We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing out this connection. The main di erence to Che and Hausch 1996 is that they assume that investments have n o v alue if there is no trade", while in our model investments are always bene cial.
consider options on asset ownership and show that such contracts can induce both parties to invest e ciently. Section 4 allows for renegotiation and shows that our main result still holds: option contracts allow to achieve e ciency under the same conditions as in the norenegotiation case. Furthermore, we show that with renegotiation the timing of the option becomes important. B must not be able to commit not to exercise his option before he invested. We discuss how this might be achieved. In Section 5 we introduce uncertainty into the model and show that options on asset ownership still implement the rst best if the uncertainty is su ciently small. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider two parties, A and B, who can generate a surplus va; b 0 at some future date 3.
The surplus can only be produced with a physical asset. The physical asset may b e a plant, machinery, a building, but also a soft" asset such as a patent or a client list. Of course, the asset could also be a set of perfectly complementary assets in which case we w ould call it a rm. The only important property is that ownership and control of the asset can be given to either party. See Hart 1995, p. 56 . are uniquely de ned and satisfy the rst order conditions In discussing our results and assumptions, we will make reference to the following additional properties that the value of the asset may satisfy. Investments are said to be independent when v ab a; b = 0 holds for all a; b. At date 0 the two parties can write a contract governing their relationship. The only contracts we consider are contracts that allocate ownership and control rights on the physical asset at date t = 3 . F or example, the initial contract could say that A owns the asset, that B owns it, or that there is joint o wnership in which case the consent of both parties is required to generate the surplus. We will use the letter o 2 f A; B; Jg to denote such an unconditional allocation of ownership rights. Here o = A denotes A-ownership, o = B denotes B ownership, and o = J denotes joint o wnership. We also allow for slightly more complicated allocations of ownership rights. In particular, one party, s a y A , could own the asset initially, but B is given the option to buy the asset at a xed price p at some date t that has to bespeci ed in the contract. 8 We will show that such an option contract can be used to implement the rst best investment levels in many i n teresting cases. This is why w e will not consider more complicated 7 An interesting case in which i n v estments may be taken to be independent, is the one in which the asset is used to produced an indivisible commodity and A's investment l o w ers the cost of producing the output with the asset, whereas B's investment increases a customer's valuation of the output. This is captured by setting va; b = u b , c a . 8 Note that an option to own is not conditional on the investment of one party or on the realization of a complicated state of the world. It simply says that the ownership right is transferred from A to B if B makes a certain payment at a date t to be speci ed in the contract. This can be veri ed easily by the courts and the feasibility o f s u c h a contract is consistent with the arguments presented in Grossman and Hart 1986 , Hart and Moore 1990 or Hart 1995 conditional ownership arrangements. The initial contract can also specify unconditional sidepayments which can be used to adjust the sharing of the total surplus between the two parties in any desired fashion. In order to save on notation we do not consider such side-payments explicitly.
Given the allocation of ownership rights in place at date 3, there may beaneed for the parties to bargain over the use of the asset to realize the full surplus va; b. We assume that bargaining, which takes place under symmetric information, always results in an e cient use of the asset, no matter how ownership rights are allocated.
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How the surplus is shared depends on the allocation of ownership rights and the nature of the investments made by the two parties because these factors determine the threatpoint in the bargaining over the use of the asset. These payo functions re ect the following considerations. First, investment costs have been sunk before date 3 so that the allocation of ownership rights only a ects how the value va; b is split between the parties. Second, the threatpoint in the bargaining game at date 3 is given by the payo each party can realize on its own. These payo s are taken to be va; b; 0 in the case of A ownership, 0; v a;b in the case of B ownership and 0; 0 in the case of joint o wnership. Third, the remaining surplus is split according to the generalized Nash-bargaining solution in proportion ; 1 , between A and B. Note that we assume to be independent of the ownership arrangement.
What is the interpretation of the threatpoints? If one party has an ownership right on the physical asset, it can prevent the other party from using the asset. Since the asset is essential for realizing any surplus, a party that does not control the asset gets a payo of 0 if there is no cooperation. Joint ownership means that each party can block the other party from using the asset, so in this case both parties receive 0 if negotiation breaks down.
If there is A, or B,ownership, the threatpoint to an owner depends on the nature of the investments. It is useful to distinguish between investments in physical and in human capital. An investment in physical capital is embodied in the physical asset. Thus, whoever owns the asset can make full use of the investment even without the cooperation of the other party. In contrast, if the investment is in human capital, then the investment is worthless to the owner of the physical asset if there is no cooperation with the investor at date 3. Obviously, a n o wner will always cooperate with himself, hence it does not matter whether the owner's investment is in physical or human capital. In the above speci cation of the payo functions, the case = 1 t h us corresponds to A investing in physical capital, whereas the case = 0 corresponds to A investing in human capital. Similarily, = 1 means that B invests in physical capital, whereas = 0 means that B invests in human capital. Less extreme cases are captured by allowing and to take values in the interval 0; 1 . Note that the agents do not choose the nature of their investments which are given exogenously. 10 Given our informational assumptions and the time structure of the investment decisions, any of the initial contracts on ownership rights we will consider gives rise to payo functions for the two players and de nes an extensive form game in a straightforward manner. Whenever we say that an initial contract induces" or implements" e cient i n v estment levels, we mean that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game corresponding to the initial contract the e cient investment choices a ; b are made on the equilibrium path. Correspondingly, the rst best cannot be induced or implemented under a given initial contract if there exist no equilibrium in the resulting game in which the e cient c hoices are made on the equilibrium path. Figure 1 summarizes the time structure of the model. To illustrate our main idea, we start with the simplest case where the contract on asset ownership cannot be renegotiated. Consider rst standard" ownership contracts, that allocate ownership rights unconditionally, i.e. the initial contract speci es either A-ownership, Bownership or joint o wnership. In their seminal paper, Grossman and Hart 1986 observed that with simultaneous investments there is no such standard ownership structure that induces both parties to invest e ciently.
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Our rst proposition adapts this result to our framework with sequential investments. As in a model with simultaneous investments, the crucial observation is that at least one party does not get the full marginal return of its investment a t a ; b
. A slight complication arises in our sequential set-up because, by moving rst, A can a ect B's investment decision through her investment level. Q.E.D.
While we do not attempt to derive the optimal" unconditional ownership structure, some remarks on the distortions caused by the various arrangements are worth making. If investments are independent there is no direct externality of the investments.
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In particular, with independent i n v estments it is possible to induce one party t o i n v est e ciently by making this party the sole owner of the asset. The other party, however, will underinvest with joint ownership both parties will underinvest. If the investments are complements, then both parties would underinvest as compared to a ; b under any unconditional ownership structure if investments were simultaneous. This is the case usually considered in the literature. With sequential investments matters are more complicated because an additional investment incentive for A arises due to the e ect her investment c hoice has on the subsequent i n v estment choice by B. Below we will consider the case in which B's investment incentives under A ownership are su ciently low to ensure that B will never invest under A ownership. In this case A will surely underinvest if she owns the asset and investments are complements. If investments are substitutes, it may happen both in the model with sequential investments considered here and with simultaneous investments that one party o v erinvests. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose that investments are substitutes and that A owns the asset. If A anticipates that B is going to invest very little e.g. because his investment is in physical capital in which case he will not invest at all, then the marginal return of A's investment is very high. Thus, if she can appropriate the full marginal return of her investment, she will invest too much as compared to a .
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Consider now a slightly more complicated ownership structure. Suppose that A owns the asset initially, but that B gets the option to buy it at price p at date 2 1 2 , i.e., after both investments have been made. 13 We show that such an option contract su ces to implement the e cient investment decision if the following assumption holds. Assumption 1 requires that B, when owning the asset, makes the conditionally e cient investment, and that B does not invest under A ownership. We impose this assumption throughout the remainder of this paper. The following proposition shows how to induce e cient investments with an option-to-own contract: Assumption 1 is strong. We thus discuss the underlying conditions under which it is satis ed, and how it may b e relaxed. Assumption 1b guarantees that A cannot bene t from investing less than a . In many cases e cient investment decisions can beimplemented with an option contract even though Assumption 1b fails. Suppose, for instance, that when A owns the asset her payo is strictly concave in a and maximized at a value greater or equal than a . In this case A will never be tempted to invest less than a , even if B were to refuse to exercise his option. Assumption 1a then su ces to achieve e ciency with an option contract. In particular, if investments are independent, i.e., if v ab a; b = 0, then it is always possible to achieve the rst best with an option contract.
It also seems worthwhile to note that the logic of Proposition 2 does not hinge on the assumption that investments are one-dimensional. In particular, whenever it is the case that i B-ownership induces B to invest e ciently given that A has made her rst best investment choice and ii B does not invest under A-ownership, the option price can be set such that B exercises his option to own if A has invested e ciently and A receives the rst best surplus in this case. For all other investment choices A receives strictly less than the rst best surplus since B gets at least zero, so e ciency can beachieved. 
Option contracts and renegotiation
In the previous section we assumed that the two parties cannot renegotiate the initial contract. Suppose now that the parties will renegotiate whenever there is scope for an e ciency improvement. The only relevant time for renegotiation is between dates 1 and 2. After date 2 investments are sunk and every ownership structure will lead to an e cient use of the asset.
The possibility of renegotiation a ects A's payo under an option contract. Suppose that A invested a a . In this case both parties anticipate that B will not exercise his option and therefore not invest, which is ine cient. Therefore, both parties have an incentive to renegotiate p to a lower price such that B is induced to buy the rm and to invest e ciently given a. Thus, if A gets some of the surplus of renegotiation, her payo if she underinvests increases. A's payo is una ected by renegotiation only if B has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation game.
To address this problem more formally, suppose that B has the option to buy the asset from A at price p at date 2 1 2 , i.e. after both investments have been sunk. Consider rst the case where a is such that U B a; b a j B p :
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In this case B's payo if he invests e ciently given a and exercises his option at the current option price p is higher than his payo from not investing and not exercising the option. In particular, A will refuse any o er by B to obtain the ownership right at a price below p, since she knows that B will nd it in his own interest to exercise the option at price p if renegotiation fails. Clearly, B will refuse any o er to obtain the ownership right at a price above p. While Proposition 3 shows that an option contract still achieves the rst best when renegotiation is possible, it is no longer clear that an option contract is required to achieve e ciency: the parties may simply agree to give A the ownership right i n the initial contract, anticipating that the ownership right will be transferred to B through renegotation to ensure that B invests e ciently as he will do under Assumption 1a. If the price at which the ownership right is transferred re ects A's investment e ort, this arrangement also provides investment incentives for A. , there is nothing to renegotiate. In particular, B cannot credibly threaten not to exercise his option if A is not willing to reduce the option price, since it is optimal for him to exercise his option anyway. Thus, A can simply refuse to bargain over the option price. Suppose now that the exercise date of the option is at date 1 The problem with this contract is that at a = a A is just indi erent whether B exercises his option or not, i.e., A's payo function is continuous at a = a . Hence the contract will fail to induce the rst best whenever A's optimal choice given A-ownership is less than a . This is illustrated in Figure 3 . If the exercise date of the option is after A but before B invested, B can extract some of the surplus from A if he can commit not to exercise his option, which may in turn distort A's investment incentives. As mentioned already in the Introduction, this problem has been observed independently by Edlin and Hermalin 1997. They conclude from this observation that an option contract can implement the rst best if and only if investments are substitutes at the margin, i.e., if a a in our model. Our interpretation of this observation is di erent. We would like to stress that the timing of the option is of crucial importance. If the exercise date of the option can be delayed until after B has to invest, then B cannot commit not to exercise the option and our Proposition 3 applies. One way to do this is to give B an American call option with an expiration date very far in the future e.g. after date 3. Since an American call option can beexercised anytime before the expiration date, B will exercise it at some point between dates 1 and 3, but he cannot commit not to exercise it before he himself invested.
A potential problem arises if B can sell or burn his option publicly at date 1 1 2 in order to commit himself not to exercise it. This problem could be solved by making the option to buy the rm inalienable and by depositing the contract with a third party such as a notary. The role of the notary is only to prevent a unilateral deviation from the contract, such as burning or selling the option. It is important to note, however, that we do not need the third party t o prevent renegotiation if there is scope for an e ciency improvement and both parties want t o renegotiate as has been shown by Proposition 3.
There is an alternative perhaps more elegant solution to this problem that does not rely on third parties: Suppose that B has to pay p to A at date 0 already. The option contract gives B the right either to become the owner of the asset or to get back p from A at date 2 1 2 . Clearly, B does not want to burn this contract because he paid p upfront already.
Furthermore, this contract is nothing but a convertible debt contract: B gives a credit p to A and has the option to either get back his money or to receive an equity stake in the asset. This solution requires that the option can only be exercised after B has made his investment decision. Otherwise B has an incentive to insist on getting back p before he himself invested.
A closely related issue is the timing of the investments. Suppose that both parties can invest over time and that they do have some discretion in when to invest how m uch. We clearly need that there is some nal date date 3 in our model after which no further investments are possible. Furthermore, we have to make sure through the timing of the option as discussed above that B cannot delay his investment u n til after his option expired. But except for this, endogenous timing of the investments does not seem to be problematic: Because A gets all of the surplus if she invests rst and chooses a she has no incentive to delay her investment. 
Uncertainty
An important question is whether the e ciency properties of option contracts are a ected if there is some uncertainty. So far our model has been fully deterministic. Given the optimal contract, B is just indi erent whether or not to exercise his option given that A invested e ciently. Thus, it may seem that our result characterizes a knife-edge case and breaks down as soon as there is some uncertainty about the surplus to be generated. In this section we are going to show that this is not the case. A properly designed option contract continues to give rst best investment incentives as long as the uncertainty is su ciently small. Note rst that any uncertainty that resolves after B's option has been exercised does not a ect our results. We can simply replace the surplus va; b with its expected value. Nor does any uncertainty matter that resolves before A's investment took place. In this case the parties can renegotiate the initial contract after the resolution of the uncertainty but before A invested in order to restore e ciency. Thus, we can restrict attention to the case where the state of the world materializes between dates 1 and 2 1 2 .
We model this as follows: the surplus is stochastic and given bỹ va; b = v a; b + ; 33 where is a random variable and va; b satis es our previous assumptions. Since is an additive term that is independent of the investments it simply accrues to whoever owns the asset at date 3. Hence, nal payo s are given by the random variablesŨ i a; b j i = U i a; b j i + andŨ i a; b j j = U i a; b j j, i; j 2 f A; Bg, i 6 = j, where U i a; b j i is the nal payo of the party who owns the asset at date 3 if there is no uncertainty.
The random variable is drawn from 0; according to a density f j. The assumption that 0 is for notational convenience and does not a ect our result But see the remark at the end of this section. The density is parameterized by because we want to vary the amout of uncertainty b y v arying the support of. More speci cally, let g be a strictly positive density de ned on the unit interval. We then let f j = 1 g :
34 Thus, if is reduced, the probabilty mass is squeezed proportionally in a smaller interval.
Suppose for concreteness that is realized between dates 1 and 2, i.e., before B's investment took place.
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The following proposition shows that the same option contract that we used in the deterministic case implements the rst best with uncertainty if the amount o f uncertainty is su ciently small. The option price in Proposition 6 is exactly the same as the one we used in Propositions 2 and 3. This is due to our assumption that the lower bound of the support of is zero. If is distributed in some interval ; , the option price would have to be chosen such that p = U B a ; b , ; 37 i.e., p has to be chosen such that B exercises his option with probability 1 if A invests e ciently.
Conclusions
The paper has shown that contingent ownership structures can induce both parties to invest e ciently in many interesting cases. This provides one explanation for the prevalent use of options-to-own, such as warrants and convertible securities, in joint ventures. The main assumptions we employed are i that the two parties invest sequentially, ii that the second party can be induced to invest e ciently by giving him the ownership right on the asset Assumption 1a, and iii the second party does not invest if the rst party o wns the asset Assumption 1b. The later two assumptions are satis ed if both parties invest in physical capital, but also if the human capital component of the second party's investment or her bargaining power are su ciently low.
As we have noted in Section 3, Assumption 1b is much stronger than needed. What about Assumption 1a? It guarantees that B invests e ciently if he owns the asset. In the model with renegotiation this assumption can berelaxed. Suppose that, being the owner, B has an incentive to overinvest. In this case the initial option contract could berenegotiated after A invested to another option contract that now gives A the right to buy the rm at a set price after B invested. This renegotiated contract will ensure that B chooses the conditionally optimal investment level. However, A will no longer receive the rst best surplus if she chooses a , making it much more di cult to characterize the conditions under which an appropriately designed initial option contract achieves the rst best.
Some further extensions of our analysis should bepossible. For instance, Proposition 6 only deals with the case where the amount of uncertainty is small". We conjecture that it is possible to use an option contract to achieve the rst best even when the construction in Proposition 6 fails because a is no longer a local maximum of A's payo function under the option price p . The idea is to raise the option price to improve A's marginal investment incentives. Note that with such a higher option price renegotiation becomes crucial to achieve e ciency, since it is no longer the case that B always exercises the option without renegotiation if A has invested e ciently. While this e ect is interesting, it further complicates the analysis of the uncertainty case and so far we have not been able to determine explicit conditions on the underlying functions which guarantee that the rst best can beachieved with an option price di erent from p . While our analysis has shown that option contracts on ownership rights are a versatile tool to achieve e cency, we have not touched upon the interesting issue of characterizing optimal ownership structures when option contracts do not implement the rst best. It is clear that option contracts will improve on unconditional ownership structures in much broader circumstances then the one considered here. For example, a simple option contract may be a useful device in a joint venture even when investment decisions are taken simultansously. However, in these cases other contractual arrangements may perform even better. Finally, i t should benoted that the options used in venture capital contracts very often are options on a fraction of a rm's equity as in the Arcor example described in the Introduction. Our simpli ed model provides no explanation of this fact which we hope to address in future research. T o see that the condition a a is also necessary forp to induce e cient investments, it remains to note that if the condition fails both functions in the minimum de ning A's payo are strictly decreasing in a at a , implying that the minimum of the two is also strictly decreasing, allowing us to conclude that A can increase his payo by c hoosing a a Q.E.D.
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